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MEASURING A "DEGREE OF DEFERENCE":
INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN A
POST-GRUTTER WORLD
Erica Goldberg* and Kelly Sarabyn**
INTRODUCTION
Academic freedom, as a constitutional right, has long
suffered from a lack of consensus over its scope and
application. Although academic freedom is generally
conceptualized as insulating certain aspects of the academy
from government intrusion, the courts are as divided as
scholars on the issue of who may invoke the right, and in
what circumstances.
Some scholars and courts argue that professors and
students have constitutional rights to academic freedom, but
universities do not. They reason that constitutional academic
freedom is a "special concern of the First Amendment,"' and
the First Amendment normally functions to protect
individuals against state interference, not to protect state
actors from interference by other state actors. They conclude,
therefore, that public universities, which are established by
the state,2 cannot seek refuge in the First Amendment.3
* Justice Robert H. Jackson Legal Fellow, Foundation for Individual
Rights in Education. J.D., Stanford Law School, 2005; B.A., Tufts University,
2002.
** 2007-2009 Justice Robert H. Jackson Legal Fellow, Foundation for
Individual Rights in Education. J.D., Yale Law School, 2007; B.A., University of
Virginia, 2003.
1. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (stating that
"Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right,
long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.").
2. For the purpose of this article, "public universities" is defined as
universities established by the state, at least partially supported by state taxes,
and required to abide by the federal Constitution. See, e.g., Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822 (1995) (noting that "[the
University of Virginia, an instrumentality of the Commonwealth for which it is
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Others espouse the opposite view: academic institutions,
but not individual faculty members or students, possess a
constitutional academic freedom right.4 Still others believe
that a constitutional right to academic freedom does not exist
at all. They recognize that the ideal of academic freedom is
championed by the Supreme Court, which has noted that "[t]o
impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our
colleges and universities would imperil the future of our
Nation."' They believe proclamations such as these, however,
named [is] bound by the First and Fourteenth Amendments."); Teitel v. Univ. of
Houston Bd. of Regents, 285 F. Supp. 2d 865, 872 (S.D. Tex. 2002). This
includes community colleges, although they are technically not universities.
3. See Matthew W. Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 TEX.
L. REV. 817, 818 (1983) (contending that "institutional autonomy" is
conceptually distinct from academic freedom, which belongs only to professors).
See also Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 943 n.25 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Saying that a
university has a First Amendment interest in this context is somewhat
troubling . . . . The First Amendment generally protects citizens from the
actions of government, not government from its citizens."). See generally
Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic Freedom-A Constitutional
Misconception: Did Grutter v. Bollinger Perpetuate the Confusion, 30 J.C. &
U.L. 531 (2004) (arguing that the First Amendment protects individual rights
only).
4. See, e.g., Borden v. Sch. Dist., 523 F.3d 153, 172 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating
the right of academic freedom, if valid, belongs entirely to the school, not the
individual teacher); Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 74-75 (3d Cir. 2001);
Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 414-15 (4th Cir. 2000). See also Paul
Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and
Hard Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497 (2007) [hereinafter Horwitz,
Universities as First Amendment Institutions]. Horwitz advocates an
"institutional approach" to the First Amendment that would afford a university
almost complete autonomy to operate in accordance with its self-defined
mission. Id. at 1500-01. Horwitz explains that this autonomy is not entirely
coterminous with academic freedom, but he supports his approach with his
interpretation of the Supreme Court's application of constitutional academic
freedom. Id.
5. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (holding that
state legislature's attempts to force a professor it deemed "subversive" to testify
about the contents of his lectures and the organizations to which he belonged
"was an invasion of petitioner's liberties in the areas of academic freedom and
political expression"). See also Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,
226 n.12 (1985) (recognizing the importance of "autonomous decisionmaking by
the academy"); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (stating
"[tihe Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude of
tongues, rather than through any kind of authoritative selection.") (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted); Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 234, 263
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (recognizing "four essential freedoms of a
university 'to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study['")
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have never independently affected the outcome of a decision
and are ultimately only rhetorical dicta.' According to this
view, academic freedom is only a professional right,' not a
legal right, except insofar as it is codified in employment and
student contracts.
The wide divergence in opinion on the constitutional
right of academic freedom has occurred in no small part
because the Supreme Court has, for half a century, deployed
the right in an opaque and vague manner, repeatedly
declaring its importance while failing to define it clearly or
definitively.' Then came Grutter v. Bollinger.9
(citation omitted); Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 342 U.S. 485, 511 (1952)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (declaring that "[academic freedom is central to] the
pursuit of truth which the First Amendment was designed to protect."),
abrogated by Keyishian v. Bd. Of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
6. See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 411 ("It is true, of course, that homage has been
paid to the ideal of academic freedom in a number of Supreme Court opinions,
often with reference to the First Amendment. Despite these accolades, the
Supreme Court has never set aside a state regulation on the basis that it
infringed a First Amendment right to academic freedom.") (citations omitted).
See also J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional Academic Freedom, 31 J.
C. & U. L. 79, 118 n.269 (2004) ("[A]cademic freedom cases often employ stirring
rhetoric without deciding much.") [hereinafter Byrne, Threat]. Byrne argues in
favor of constitutional academic freedom and notes that "the Grutter decision
differs from all prior academic freedom decisions in using modest rhetoric to
enlarge the substance of academic freedom rather than using fiery rhetoric to
make a narrow decision." Id. at 118.
7. Academic freedom as a "professional" ideal is well established, codified
into principles, and has been chiefly monitored by the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP). See Matthew W. Finkin and Robert C. Post, FOR
THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM (Yale
University Press 2009). The AAUP has adjudicated individual cases of alleged
violations of professional academic freedom since its founding in 1915. Though
the AAUP has no legal authority over universities, its censure of
administrations serves as a somewhat effective public reprimand for
institutions who seek to disregard academic freedom. The AAUP's "case law"
provides a thorough picture of the outlines of academic freedom as a
professional right. The legal right, though clearly related to the professional
right, need not track its contours. See generally Rebecca Gose Lynch, Comment,
Pawns of the State or Priests of Democracy? Analyzing Professors' Academic
Freedom Rights Within the State's Managerial Realm, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1061
(2003) (discussing the distinctions between the professional and constitutional
conceptions of academic freedom).
8. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-30 (2003) (summarizing
the Court's history of affirming universities' right of academic freedom); Sweezy,
354 U.S. at 250-51 (stating that students and university teachers have rights of
academic freedom); William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First
Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical
Review, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1990).
9. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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The Supreme Court's invocation of academic freedom in
Grutter unambiguously declared that the courts must give a
"degree of deference to a university's academic decisions,
within constitutionally prescribed limits.""o This declaration
bolstered the institutional view of academic freedom.
However, the ambiguity of this language, perhaps stemming
from the Court's particular concern with preserving the
University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action
program, resurrected many of the same questions about
academic freedom under a different framework. Now
scholars and courts must contend with the question of
whether this right can be invoked by the university against
state action, or whether it can be invoked only as part of the
balancing test when a public university asserts an interest in
overriding another party's constitutional rights,1 as was the
case in Grutter. Scholars and courts must further determine
the boundaries of the "constitutionally prescribed limits"
circumscribing the right, and navigate the interactions of
institutional academic freedom with the academic freedom
rights of students and professors.
Although important and thoughtful articles have been
written on the subject of institutional academic freedom since
Grutter," scholars often overlook both the differences
10. Id. at 328.
11. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237, 247
(6th Cir. 2009).
[Ilt is one thing to defer to a state university's judgment in deciding
who may attend that university . . . in determining whether the
university has run the gauntlet of defending presumptively
unconstitutional racial classifications. It is quite another to say that
the First Amendment in general and academic freedom in particular
prohibit a State from eliminating racial preferences.
Id. According to one scholar, Grutter did not "propose that the Law School had
a First Amendment right to autonomy (or academic freedom) that off-set in any
way Ms. Grutter's equal protection claim; the Court simply concluded-without
engaging in any reported 'balancing'-that the various state or governmental
interests implicated in the School's admissions program were more important
than that equal protection right." See Richard H. Hiers, Institutional Academic
Freedom or Autonomy Grounded Upon the First Amendment: A Jurisprudential
Mirage, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 55 (2007).
12. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 77
U. COLO. L. REV. 907 (2006) (exploring whether academic freedom is a
constitutional right, and how it protects individual professors and institutions);
R. George Wright, The Emergence of First Amendment Academic Freedom, 85
NEB. L. REV. 793 (2007); Laura A. Jeltema, Comment, Legislators in the
Classroom: Why State Legislatures Cannot Decide Higher Education Curricula,
220 [Vol:51
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between public and private universities, and the complicated
constitutional position of the public university, which can
violate students' and professors' rights, yet can also assert its
own rights against other state actors.13  In addition, the
conflict between the institutional academic freedom rights of
the university and the individual academic freedom rights of
its faculty remains.1 4 Finally, there has been no post-Grutter
examination of how the lower courts have applied
institutional academic freedom.
The lower courts are currently bereft of a proper
framework to understand institutional academic freedom. If
courts are to honor Grutter's words and treat universities
with some "degree of deference," 15  however, they must
determine when a university decision deserves deference and
how to apply that deference. They must avoid overstating
that deference, like Professor Horwitz, who argues that a
university, as a "First Amendment institution," should be
54 AM. U. L. REV. 215 (2004) (arguing that institutional academic freedom
prohibits legislatures from controlling the curriculum of public universities).
13. Professor Judith Areen proposes a potentially workable approach to
academic freedom, arguing that the right "is central to the functioning and
governance of colleges and universities." Judith Areen, Government as
Educator: A New Understanding of First Amendment Protection of Academic
Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 947 (2009). She creates
constitutional doctrine based on a conception of the public university as
"educator," in addition to its sovereign and employer roles. See id. at 947-48
(exploring the "governance dimension" to institutional academic freedom, and
examining situations where both faculty and administrators make governing
decisions). However, Areen limits her approach to the context of professors'
speech rights. Her proposals are intended as a way to avoid creating a sui
generis exception to the public-employee speech doctrine of Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 10 (2006), which gives the government wide latitude in regulating
employees' speech. Id. at 946-47 ("This Article responds to the invitation in
Garcetti to identify constitutional interests that support academic freedom and
that are not fully accounted for by public-employee speech jurisprudence."). As
a result, Areen addresses only the academic-freedom rights at state
universities, and does not address the many different postures in which
institutional academic freedom can be invoked.
14. See Schauer, supra note 12, at 919 ("[Tlhere is no avoiding the conflict
between a view of academic freedom that views individual academics as its
primary and direct beneficiaries, and a contrasting view that locates the right in
academic institutions, even if doing so limits the individual rights of the
employees of those institutions."). See also Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing,
474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985) ("Academic freedom thrives not only on the
independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students,
but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decision-making by the
academy itself.") (citations omitted).
15. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
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given considerable latitude to promulgate policies that would
otherwise violate the Constitution, so long as the universities
act in accordance with their "academic mission."" Horwitz's
caveat that universities adhere to their own mission does not
constrain universities in any meaningful way because,
according to Horwitz, a university may define its own
academic mission and allow that mission to evolve over
time. "
Horwitz, like many scholars who have recently addressed
academic freedom, bases his argument for expansive
institutional autonomy on Grutter.'1 However, Grutter, which
upheld the University of Michigan Law School's race-
conscious admissions policy against an equal protection
challenge, did not permit the law school to determine its own
educational mission. Instead, it held that the law school's
goal of "student body diversity" was a compelling interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment because of the Court's own
judgment that student body diversity is part of a law school's
proper educational mission." It then deferred-to a degree-
to the law school's chosen method of achieving student body
diversity (in this case, a race-sensitive admissions process).
In this article, we begin to delineate the contours of, and
practical considerations involved in applying, the
constitutional concept of "academic freedom" to universities
post-Grutter. We believe that courts should apply academic
freedom only to legitimately academic, ideologically neutral
decisions of a university, and should afford different amounts
16. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 4, at
1519.
17. Id. at 1547. Horwitz contends that "rather than imposing a static
conception of academic freedom and the mission of the university when defining
the scope of constitutional educational autonomy for universities," courts
"should defer substantially to universities' own sense of what their academic
mission requires, and their own sense of what academic freedom entails." Id. at
1547-48.
18. See also J. Peter Byrne, What Next for Academic Freedom?:
Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting Real About the "Four
Freedoms" of a University, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 929 (2006) (arguing that Grutter
represents "a high-water mark for the recognition and influence of
constitutional academic freedom" and applying Grutter's holding to several fact
patterns) [hereinafter Byrne, What Next for Academic Freedom?].
19. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 ("Our conclusion that the Law School has a
compelling interest in a diverse student body is informed by our view that
attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School's proper
institutional mission.").
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of deference based on how much academic expertise the
decision required and whose rights the decision places at
stake. We begin our article in Part I by illuminating the
ambiguities in Grutter and analyzing the courts' approaches
to institutional academic freedom since Grutter.20 In Part ,
we argue that courts must establish threshold requirements
before applying constitutional academic freedom, which
should be implicated only when a university's actions serve a
"legitimate academic purpose," and we define which purposes
are legitimately academic. 2 1 In Part III, we explain why
universities may not exercise their institutional autonomy in
ways that trample upon the rights of students and
professors.22 Finally, in Part IV, we construct a test for
courts to use that applies different amounts of deference to a
university's implementation of its legitimate academic
purpose depending on who is making the academic decision
and in what context academic freedom is being invoked.23
It is important to note that this article concerns academic
freedom as a constitutional right. Universities may adhere to
different understandings of professional academic freedom,
and act ideologically as long as they do not violate their
obligations under state, federal, or constitutional law. It is
only when universities invoke the concept of constitutional
academic freedom to receive deference or special protection
from the courts that their decisions must be ideologically
neutral and academic in nature.
In addition, private universities, who are not subject to
the constitutional obligations of public universities, have
more leeway to experiment with different understandings of
the purpose and role of the university. They may, as Horwitz
wishes, "let a thousand flowers bloom" 24 in discovering their
own academic goals, what institutional ideals they wish to
promote, and how to best fulfill those goals. However, this
experimentation must operate outside the scope of
constitutional academic freedom; neither private nor public
colleges should be afforded Grutter's "degree of deference"
20. See discussion infra Part I.
21. See discussion infra Part II.
22. See discussion infra Part III.
23. See discussion infra Part IV.
24. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 4, at
1549.
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unless they are acting with a "legitimate academic purpose."
I. GRUTTER AND ITS APPLICATION BY THE LOWER COURTS
A. Grutter's Institutional Deference
Because so many articles have thoroughly detailed the
Supreme Court's invocation of academic freedom prior to
Grutter, we will not trace its history here.2 5 We begin our
analysis with Grutter's application of institutional academic
freedom and then address the aftermath of that decision.
In Grutter, a prospective student who was denied
admission by the University of Michigan Law School brought
a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge to the
school's use of race in its admissions decisions.2 6 In its
analysis, the Court applied the general equal protection
doctrine, which requires that all "governmental action based
on race . . . be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure
that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not
been infringed."2 7 The Court analyzed the Law School's
admissions policy under a strict-scrutiny framework that
allows the use of race only when it is justified by a
"compelling government interest."28
In upholding the Law School's admissions policy, the
Grutter court explicitly referenced institutional "academic
freedom." The Court noted that "universities occupy a special
niche in our constitutional tradition," and cited Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke for the idea that there is a
"constitutional dimension, grounded in the First
Amendment, of educational autonomy."30 Quoting and
expanding upon Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, the
25. See, e.g., Areen, supra note 13, at 967-85; Hiers, supra note 11, at 6-56;
Van Alstyne, supra note 8; J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special
Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251, 312-27 (1989) [hereinafter
Byrne, Academic Freedom]; see also infra Part II.B for an analysis of some of the
pre-Grutter academic freedom decisions. For a historical overview of the
differences between professional academic freedom and constitutional academic
freedom, see Walter Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of
Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (1987-1988).
26. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
27. Id. at 326 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
227 (1995)).
28. Id. at 327.
29. California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
30. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
224 [Vol:51
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Grutter opinion continued:
"The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as
to education includes the selection of its student body."
From this premise, Justice Powell reasoned that by
claiming "the right to select those students who will
contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas,"' a
university "seek[s] to achieve a goal that is of paramount
importance in the fulfillment of its mission." Our
conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest
in a diverse student body is informed by our view that
attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law
School's proper institutional mission, and that "good faith"
on the part of a university is "presumed" absent "a
showing to the contrary. "31
Grutter therefore legitimized the university's right to
select students who would best promote a robust exchange of
ideas because dissemination of ideas is a proper part of the
university's institutional mission.3 2 Robust exchanges of
ideas provide educational benefits because they are, according
to the Court, "enlightening and interesting" and capable of
dispelling stereotypes.3 3
The Grutter Court expounded upon its initial analysis in
a confusing fashion, however, writing:
Today, we hold that the Law School has a compelling
interest in attaining a diverse student body.
The Law School's educational judgment that such
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to
which we defer. The Law School's assessment that
diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits is
substantiated by respondents and their amici. Our
scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is no
less strict for taking into account complex educational
judgments in an area that lies primarily within the
expertise of the university. Our holding today is in
keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference
to a university's academic decisions, within
constitutionally prescribed limits. 34
31. Id. (citations omitted) (emphases added).
32. According to the Court, "classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited,
and simply more enlightening and interesting when the students have the
greatest possible variety of backgrounds." Id. at 330.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 328.
2011] 225
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This language presents internal ambiguities that, unless
clarified, will stymie lower courts or allow judges to apply
Grutter in an unprincipled manner. For instance, if the Court
has chosen to "defer" to the Law School's educational
judgment that diversity is essential to its institutional
mission, then why does that not render the scrutiny "less
strict"? And if the Court is deferring to a university's
understanding of how to fulfill its proper educational goals,
why must the assessment that diversity yields educational
benefits be "substantiated" by amici? Finally, if "a degree of
deference" is given to a university's academic decisions, how
does that accord with requiring that university decisions
conform to "constitutionally prescribed limits"? The Court
never clearly explains how much deference the Law School is
given, and to what portion of the constitutional analysis the
deference attaches.
The best interpretation of this passage is that the Court
first determined that the Law School's educational goals,
including promoting lively discussion and greater
comprehension of students with various backgrounds, were
legitimate academic goals and were in keeping with the
proper mission of the university. The Court then deferred
somewhat to the Law School's method of "assembling a class
that is both exceptionally academically qualified and broadly
diverse," including designing an admissions policy that
considers prospective students' race as one factor among
many, in order to fulfill these educational goals." The Court
appreciated that "[niot every decision influenced by race is
equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is designed to
provide a framework for carefully examining the importance
and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the
governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that
particular context."3 ' The Court held that the Law School's
race-conscious admissions policy was based on less
objectionable decisions influenced by race, and in so doing
deferred to the university's "good faith"3 belief that its
admissions policy promotes the Law School's legitimate
academic mission.
35. Id. at 329.
36. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).
37. Id. at 329.
38. Without commenting on the merits of the Fourteenth Amendment equal
[Vol:51226
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In dissent, Justice Kennedy objected to this analysis. He
argued that the Court should defer to an institution's own
understanding of its educational mission, and then
scrupulously ensure that the university's method of fulfilling
that mission is truly effective.39 This contrasts directly with
the Grutter majority, which seemed to be deciding for itself a
university's proper educational mission, and then deferring to
the Law School's view that student body diversity
accomplishes that mission and yields the educational benefits
ratified by the Court.4 0 According to Kennedy:
Justice Powell's approval of the use of race in university
admissions [in Bakke] reflected a tradition, grounded in
the First Amendment, of acknowledging a university's
conception of its educational mission. [411 Our precedents
provide a basis for the Court's acceptance of a university's
considered judgment that racial diversity among students
can further its educational task, when supported by
empirical evidence.
It is unfortunate, however, that the Court takes the first
part of Justice Powell's rule but abandons the second. 4 2
Kennedy's conception of academic freedom misconstrues
protection claim, we believe that Grutter's application of its own academic-
freedom standard may have given the University of Michigan Law School too
much deference. The Court, in deferring to the school's stated goal of achieving
student body diversity through enrolling a "critical mass" of students of certain
racial and ethnic minorities, may have overlooked critical and significant
evidence that the law school's "critical mass" rationale was a pretext for
achieving "racial balancing." See id. at 381 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). As
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent notes, "[ilf the Law School is admitting
between 91 and 108 African-Americans in order to achieve 'critical mass,'
thereby preventing African-American students from feeling 'isolated or like
spokespersons for their race,' one would think that a number of the same order
of magnitude would be necessary to accomplish the same purpose for Hispanics
and Native Americans." Id. Although Grutter may not have followed its own
dictates of presuming good faith on the part of the university "absent 'a showing
to the contrary'", id. at 329 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 319 (1978)), lower courts should take Grutter's language as instructive,
even if it was not scrupulously followed in Grutter.
39. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387-88.
40. Id. at 339. The Court did, however, inquire somewhat into whether the
law school had given "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
alternatives" when deferring to the law school's race-conscious admissions
process designed to achieve "student body diversity." Id.
41. According to one scholar, "Justice Kennedy cited no cases that might
constitute such a tradition, for there were no such cases." See Hiers, supra note
11, at 52.
42. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387-88 (citations omitted).
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Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. Powell defined the limits
of which educational missions are entitled deference by
holding that a university's academic freedom right includes
the ability to select a student body that creates "an
atmosphere of speculation, experiment, and creation.""
According to Justice Powell, it is "widely believed"" that this
atmosphere is produced through a diverse student body-not
just racially diverse, but "truly heterogeneous"4 5 in terms of
ideas and background. Powell's concurring opinion, which is
"endorsed by" the Grutter majority,4 6 invalidated the
affirmative action plan at the University of California's
medical school because the "diversity that furthers a
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic
origin is but a single though important element."4 7
Justice Powell prohibited schools from putting too much
emphasis on race in achieving a diverse student body based
on his understanding of a truly academic atmosphere. 8 He
found that the school's race-conscious admission process was
not genuinely designed to achieve the type of student body
diversity that would produce the legitimate academic benefit
of robust intellectual exchange.49
B. The Solomon Amendment Makes Its Way Through the
Courts
The confusion presented by both the Grutter majority and
Kennedy's dissent has created a judiciary that is tentative in
defining and applying the right to institutional academic
freedom. After Grutter, the Supreme Court dodged an
opportunity to further clarify the scope of institutional
academic freedom in a case involving the Solomon
Amendment. 0 The Solomon Amendment is a federal law
mandating that universities either allow military recruiters
43. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 323.
46. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
47. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
48. Id. at 311-15.
49. Id.
50. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR),
547 U.S. 47 (2006).
228 [Vol:51
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onto their campuses or forgo millions of dollars in federal
funding." In the Solomon Amendment case, unlike in
Grutter, law schools invoked academic freedom as a
constitutional right that protected them from government
interference with their academic decisions. 52  The schools
argued that the Solomon Amendment should be invalidated
because it interfered with their constitutional right to make
their academic decisions free from the control of (other)
government bodies."
Litigation over the Solomon Amendment began when a
coalition of law schools and faculty, called Forum for
Academic and Institutional Rights, brought suit claiming that
the Solomon Amendment violated their First Amendment
rights.5 4 The law schools, wishing to abide by their own
policies denying recruitment opportunities to employers who
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, argued that
the Solomon Amendment infringed on their rights against
compelled speech and to expressive association due to the
military's practice of excluding gays. 5 The Third Circuit
agreed and granted a preliminary injunction against
application of the Solomon Amendment. 6 In a footnote, the
Third Circuit noted that "[t]he Supreme Court's academic
freedom jurisprudence thus underscores the importance" of
deferring to a university's views on what would impair its
own expression.
The Supreme Court overturned the Third Circuit and
held that that the law schools' claim "exaggerat[ed] the reach
of our First Amendment precedents."5 8 However, the Court
never mentioned the Third Circuit's footnote or the impact of
academic freedom on the constitutionality of the Solomon
Amendment. The Supreme Court thus missed a critical
opportunity to remark upon the Third Circuit's interpretation
of academic freedom and how academic freedom would affect
the university's claim.
After the Supreme Court ignored the issue, another court
51. 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000).
52. Brief for the Respondents at 20-21, FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (No. 04-1152).
53. Id.
54. FAIR, 390 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2004).
55. Id. at 225 n.3.
56. Id. at 224.
57. Id. at 224 n.13.
58. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 69 (2006).
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of appeals had to contend with the Third Circuit's
unaddressed footnote. Following the Supreme Court's
decision in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, the Second Circuit addressed a
challenge to the Solomon Amendment that had been stayed
pending the Supreme Court's ruling on the Third Circuit's
case.59 This stayed lawsuit was brought by a voting majority
of the Yale Law School faculty.6 0 In upholding the Solomon
Amendment, the Second Circuit noted that although the
Supreme Court did not explicitly address academic freedom
in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, it implicitly considered and rejected the
argument that academic freedom renders the Solomon
Amendment unconstitutional. 6'
The Second Circuit also held, on the merits, that
academic freedom was not violated because the Solomon
Amendment did not directly interfere with the content of
teaching, the ability of faculty to express themselves, or the
selection and evaluation of students. 62 According to the court,
"[wihile requiring universities to grant military recruiters ...
equal access to their campuses and students may incidentally
detract from the academic mission of inculcating respect for
equal rights, this requirement undermines educational
autonomy in a much less direct and more speculative way"
than in the instances where the Supreme Court has found a
school to have a legitimate academic freedom claim." The
court of appeals thus did not deny the ability of universities
to invoke academic freedom as a constitutional right that
could supersede federal law; it simply held that the right was
not violated by the Solomon Amendment.
C. The Different Faces of Academic Freedom in the Lower
Courts
Since Grutter, courts have deployed a variety of
approaches in their understanding of institutional academic
freedom as a constitutional right against state interference.
In Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, for
example, plaintiffs challenged an amendment to the
Constitution of the State of Michigan, enacted as a response
59. Burt v. Gates, 502 F.3d 183, 185 (2d Cir. 2007).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 189-90.
62. Id. at 191-92.
63. Id. at 191.
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to Grutter, that prohibited racial preferences in admission
decisions at public universities." The plaintiffs claimed that
universities have an academic freedom right, based on
Grutter, "to select their students and . . . in the course of
doing so, give some consideration to such factors . . . as
race."65 The Sixth Circuit held otherwise:
[Ilt is one thing to defer to a state university's judgment ...
in determining whether the university has run the
gauntlet of defending presumptively unconstitutional
racial classifications. It is quite another to say that the
First Amendment in general and academic freedom in
particular prohibit a State from eliminating racial
preferences ....
The Universities mistake interests grounded in the First
Amendment-including their interests in selecting
student bodies-with First Amendment rights.6
At first blush, the result in Granholm seems strange;
academic freedom prevailed in Grutter against the dictates of
the Fourteenth Amendment, but could not override a
Michigan law proscribing the race-conscious admissions
policies that Grutter deemed constitutional.6 7 The Sixth
Circuit, however, distinguished the type of institutional
academic freedom that prevailed in Grutter-the deference
afforded a state university in the implementation of a policy
that the university purports to further a compelling
governmental interest-from the institutional academic
freedom asserted in the instant case-the ability to use
academic freedom as a right against the state in order to
invalidate a state law.6 8
The Sixth Circuit justified this distinction in several
ways, noting that:
Grutter ends by explaining that affirmative action
64. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237 (6th Cir.
2006).
65. Id. at 242.
66. Id. at 247 (emphasis added).
67. According to Professor Byrne, who considered a hypothetical version of
this case prior to Granholm, "it would introduce a novel notion of what is a
constitutional right to hold that one has special, constitutional weight against
other constitutionally protected interests while still being vulnerable to state
legislation." Byrne, What Next for Academic Freedom?, supra note 18, at 937-
38.
68. Granholm, 473 F.3d at 247.
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programs may not exist in perpetuity . . . . The First
Amendment, by contrast, has no termination point,
whether in 25, 50 or 250 years, making it improbable that
the same Court that decided Grutter would hold that state
universities have a First Amendment right to maintain
racial preferences.69
The difference between academic freedom as a
constitutionally compelling state interest and as a
constitutional right is paramount in Granholm, but Grutter
did not explicitly articulate this distinction.0
The First Circuit, in contrast to the Sixth Circuit in
Granholm, recognized institutional academic freedom as a
constitutional right that is capable of overriding state law in
a case involving high schools.7 1 This court overturned Puerto
Rican educational regulations governing private elementary
and high schools on academic freedom grounds. 72 Noting that
"the right to academic freedom in secondary education is
necessarily more circumscribed than that of a university," the
court held that the "regulation of textbooks implicates
academic freedom sufficiently to require the state to
demonstrate that the regulation withstands constitutional
scrutiny.""
The court then overturned a regulation requiring
parental consent of textbooks and a regulation mandating
that schools allow students to purchase older editions of
textbooks unless the newer version contains "significant
changes."7 According to the court, these regulations
implicated academic freedom because they interfered with
"what shall be taught and how it shall be taught."7 5 The
court upheld only a portion of the regulations requiring
disclosure of textbook prices and special deals with
booksellers, but invalidated all other challenged provisions.
Universities have also invoked the constitutional
69. Id. at 248.
70. See infra Part IV.C for further discussion on the reasoning and outcome
of Granholm.
71. See Asociaci6n de Educaci6n Privada de P.R., Inc. v. Garcia-Padilla, 490
F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that "private schools have a First Amendment
right to academic freedom.").
72. Id. at 11, 21.
73. Id. at 11.
74. Id. at 11-18.
75. Id. at 19 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)).
76. Id. at 11-21.
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academic freedom right as insulating them against other
legal obligations, including burden of proof requirements. In
Walker v. Board of Regents, for example, an assistant
chancellor for student affairs at the University of Wisconsin
alleged that the university failed to renew her contract
because of her race and gender." The university argued that
"courts must give 'enhanced deference' to employers in the
university context and that this deference 'militates against a
finding"' at the summary judgment stage that the
university's stated reasons for failing to renew Walker's
contract were a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination."
To substantiate its claim for "enhanced deference," the
university quoted the Supreme Court's opinion in Hishon v.
King & Spalding for the proposition that "respect for
academic freedom requires some deference to the judgment of
schools and universities as to the qualifications of professors,
particularly those considered for tenured positions."" The
district court, however, rejected the university's argument
that academic freedom militates in favor of affording some
deference to the university's stated nondiscriminatory motive
for its employment decision.80 Declining the opportunity to
extend Grutter beyond its factual scenario, the district court
held that "[alt most, the Court has suggested that academic
freedom could be a relevant consideration in evaluating
affirmative action plans."" Ultimately, the court refused to
give universities more deference than other employers when
assessing motives for employment decisions in discrimination
cases. 8 2
The varying contexts in which academic freedom is
invoked, and the varying approaches by the lower courts,
demand a coherent and comprehensive framework for
analyzing academic freedom claims. In the next section, we
77. Walker v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 300 F. Supp. 2d 836, 842-
43 (W.D. Wis. 2004).
78. Id. at 858.
79. Walker, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 858-59 (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding,
467 U.S. 69, 80 n.4 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring)). In Hishon, the Court
considered an employment discrimination case in the private employment
context that did not "present such an issue" of academic freedom. Hishon, 467
U.S. at 80 n.4.
80. Walker, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 858-59.
81. Id. at 858.
82. Id. at 859.
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begin to outline that framework.
II. THE LEGITIMATE ACADEMIC PURPOSE
In order to justify granting universities special deference
based on academic freedom, courts must ensure that the
university is acting with a purpose that is genuinely
academic.83  Otherwise, the argument for granting
universities greater rights than other, more political,
institutions quickly loses cogency.8 4
Of course, academic institutions may subscribe to varying
philosophies on the role and purpose of the university, and
define their missions accordingly. But academic freedom as a
constitutional right should apply only when the institutions
proffer ideologically neutral goals that are explicitly and
legitimately academic, and are intended to further the truth-
seeking and knowledge-transmitting functions of the
university." The courts must police this right using
principled, clear rules that define what constitutes a
legitimate academic purpose.
83. Byrne, What Next for Academic Freedom?, supra note 18, at 939.
Any special protection of [university] decision making must be rooted in
the values of the First Amendment . . . . Protecting institutional
autonomy is the means and preserving the scholarship and teaching is
the end. Seeking to protect aspects of autonomy removed from this will
fail and threaten to bring the entire right into disrepute as a simple
'interest,' like users of subsidized irrigation.
Id.
84. See Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury,
545 F.3d 4, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Silberman, J., concurring). See also Larry
Alexander, Academic Freedom, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006) ("If
academics are functioning not as academics but as political advocates, then they
do not merit academic freedom.").
85. Indeed, a religious institution such as Bob Jones University may decide
that part of its mission is to inculcate Christian values. Bob Jones University is
free to do so, as long it does not intend to circumvent any state laws or invoke
academic freedom to advance this mission. Similarly, a private, liberal arts
college may champion certain political ideologies, but it may not claim a right to
academic freedom to circumvent state or federal laws for this aspect of its
mission. This is because one of the main justifications for academic freedom is
that, in ways related to other First Amendment values, academic freedom seeks
to increase the knowledge in society by ensuring that the academy does not
stifle speech for personal, political or ideological reasons, as opposed to
academic, truth-seeking reasons-and that the academy does not stifle the
spread of knowledge to the populace, or try to stifle innovation within academic
discourse. See infra Part II.C.
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A. Courts Must Police the Legitimate Academic Purpose
This view of the courts' role, as a check on illegitimate
invocations of academic freedom, rejects the method
advocated by scholars like Horwitz, who argues that "the
institutional approach to universities requires that the debate
over institutional mission be held by individual universities,
and that neither the courts nor legislatures be given
jurisdiction to interfere with that debate."" In his view,
deference to the institution should extend to the question of
what constitutes an academic-versus political-decision. As
a result, he criticizes the Supreme Court's decision in
Rumsfeld v. FAIR," writing:
Under an approach that took Grutter deference seriously,
the Court would have been obliged to defer substantially
to the FAIR plaintiffs' assertion that their desire to
exclude military recruiters from campus, or to grant them
something less than absolutely equal access, was
compelled by their own sense of their academic mission,
and that compliance with the [law in question] would do
serious violence to that academic mission.8 8
Horwitz believes that universities should be given
"presumptive autonomy to act" and that a university's
"internal norms" should govern its decisions instead of the
Constitution." In the speech area, for instance, Horwitz
believes that courts should not ask whether the university is
following generally applicable First Amendment principles,
but instead whether it is generally following its own "norms
and practices," and "whether those norms and practices serve
the First Amendment values that are advanced by the role of
that institution within the broader society." 0 In this way,
86. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 4, at
1552.
87. See supra Part I.B.
88. Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1061,
1130 (2008) [hereinafter Horwitz, Three Faces].
89. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 4, at
1510-11. Horwitz advances both a weak and a strong form of institutional
autonomy, and would provide different amounts of deference to these different
forms. His article makes clear, however, that he believes a university's self-
defining rules should supersede "the externally imposed, top-down model of
judicial enforcement of standard First Amendment rules." Id. at 1511.
90. Id. See also Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV.
461, 589 (2005) (suggesting that "the Court ought to attend to the unique social
practices of [universities], allowing the scope of its deference to be guided over
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Horwitz claims that universities (including public
universities otherwise subject to the First Amendment)
should be able to make their own decisions about censoring
speech on campus, depending on their institutional ideas
about which speech is and is not valuable.9' And instead of
drawing these norms from the First Amendment, these
decisions can be "'guided over time by the changing norms
and values"' of each institution.9 2
Horwitz's approach is fundamentally flawed because,
among other missteps, it ignores the reason that institutions
are entitled to academic freedom under the First Amendment.
Academic freedom is designed to promote a robust exchange
of ideas and foster an environment where speech is restricted
only because of its academic quality, not because it is
politically undesirable."
Further, Horwitz's proposed deference to schools to
determine their mission creates an unworkable tautology.
Namely, Horwitz conceives of an academic decision as
anything decided by a university, 9 4 but this does not require
universities to conform to any type of academic standards. To
avoid a conception of academic freedom and institutional
deference that cannot be supported by the rationales for
academic freedom, institutions receiving deference must not
be able to dictate the terms of that deference.
Like all other constitutional rights, courts must police the
constitutional right to academic freedom based on a
longstanding tradition that cherishes the "expansive
time by the changing norms and values of those institutions.") [hereinafter
Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment].
91. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 4, at
1519.
92. Id. at 1523 (quoting Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, supra note 90,
at 589.).
93. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967) ("The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a
multitude of tongues, rather than through any kind of authoritative selection.")
(quoting United States v. Associated Press, D.C., 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943)
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). See also infra Part II.C.
94. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 4, at
1542. Horwitz defines academic speech "at its best" as "characterized by its
commitment to truth . . . its honesty and carefulness, its richness of meaning,
its doctrinal freedom, and its invitation to criticism," but in no way requires
academic speech to contain these characteristics in order to receive judicial
deference. See id. at 1514 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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freedoms of speech and thought associated with the
university environment."" Giving courts the ability to define
this right separately from an institution's own conception of
the academic mission does not mean that courts will be able
to unduly interfere with academic decisionmaking. Instead
courts will determine, as a threshold issue, which situations
involving universities require more judicial deference and
which situations require treating private universities like
other private organizations, and public universities like other
state actors. Courts can thus preserve spheres of university
activity that permit more or less scrutiny.
B. Courts Have Already Begun Confining Institutional
Academic Freedom to Legitimately Academic Decisions
Although they are hesitant to articulate rules or tests to
analyze academic freedom, courts have already begun
shaping which areas of university operation trigger academic
freedom considerations. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,9 6
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence quoted a statement by
scholars at the University of Cape Town, South Africa,
categorizing the "four essential freedoms of a university-to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study."97 Almost three decades later, in Regents
of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, the Court further
elevated the notion of the "four essential freedoms" in a case
where a student argued that a medical school arbitrarily
expelled him without permitting him to retake an exam.9 8
Even assuming that the student had a substantive right to
continued enrollment at his university, the Court held that a
university's freedom to decide who may study at the
university was implicated, and that "[tihis narrow avenue for
judicial review precludes any conclusion that the decision to
dismiss Ewing from the . . . program was such a substantial
departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate
95. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
96. 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
97. Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting The
Open Universities in South Africa 10-12, which Frankfurter described as "[a]
statement of a conference of senior scholars from the University of Cape Town
and the University of the Witwatersrand") (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
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that the faculty did not exercise professional judgment."99
Based on the notion of "four freedoms," one scholar has
contended that academic freedom "primarily protects the
autonomy of university governance on core matters relating
to scholarship and teaching, including especially the values
and practices that make up the non-legal system of academic
freedom, but that it does not protect most university
activities, which are fully subject to government
regulation." 00
Courts have also begun identifying situations where laws
that affect university functioning are too attenuated from
teaching and scholarship to qualify for academic freedom. In
University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission,o" for example, the Court rejected the
university's expansive understanding of academic freedom,
holding that academic freedom does not permit a university
to refuse to disclose files relating to the tenure process
required for a government investigation of potential
discriminatory denial of tenure to a faculty member. 10 2
Although noting that it does not have to "define the precise
contours of any academic-freedom right," the Court held that
the required production of employment records is too
attenuated from the asserted academic freedom right of
deterring discourse at the university.' 03
The Court further remarked that disclosing tenure
records in court will not impede a university's ability to
99. Id. at 227.
100. Byrne, What Next for Academic Freedom?, supra note 18, at 934. As
Byrne notes, "the Court has rejected university arguments for deference when it
has failed to see the direct connection with academic concerns, as in its decision
to subject NCAA football television contracts to antitrust analysis." Id. at 941
(citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98-99 (1984)).
101. Univ. of Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182 (1978).
102. Id. at 197-98.
103. Id. at 199-202. See also Burt v. Gates, 502 F.3d 183, 191 (2d Cir. 2007).
The Solomon Amendment places no restriction on the content of
teaching, the membership of teachers in organizations, the selection of
students, or evaluation and retention of students. While requiring
universities to grant military recruiters that discriminate in hiring
equal access to their campuses and students may incidentally detract
from the academic mission of inculcating respect for equal rights, this
requirement undermines educational autonomy in a much less direct
and more speculative way than do the policies addressed in Sweezy,
Keyishian, Grutter, and Ewing.
Id.
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determine who may teach. According to the Court, "[njothing
we say today should be understood as a retreat from this
principle of respect for legitimate academic
decisionmaking." 0 4 A "legitimate" academic decision would
not result from racial intolerance because a decision based on
animus is unrelated to the quality of teaching or scholarship.
The Court's statement in University of Pennsylvania
foreshadows the Grutter Court's recognition of the difference
between proper and improper educational missions and its
holding that "[olur conclusion that the Law School has a
compelling interest in a diverse student body is informed by
our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart
of the Law School's proper institutional mission . . . ."o
C. Deference Should be Afforded only for Non-Ideological
Academic Decisions
Determining when a university is acting to fulfill a
proper educational mission is a complex, but not Herculean,
undertaking. Academic freedom rights derive from the First
Amendment's concern with the social benefit of allowing
scholars to pursue knowledge based on the dictates of a
particular discipline.206 This knowledge should grow based on
the input and critique of scholars and be insulated from
governmentally-imposed rules or political pressure.o0 There
104. Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 199 (emphasis in original).
105. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (emphasis added). For
another example of the Court refusing to base its decision on a university's
conception of its own mission, see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 (1981)
("The University's institutional mission, which it describes as providing a
'secular education' to its students . . . does not exempt its actions from
constitutional scrutiny.") (internal citations omitted).
106. See Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 4,
at 1538 ("In modern terms, we assume that the academic freedom of a faculty
member depends on his or her ability to satisfy the standards of his or her
discipline."). See also Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 1940 Statement of
Principles On Academic Freedom And Tenure With 1970 Interpretive
Comments 3 (2006) ("Institutions of higher education are conducted for the
common good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or
the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search for
truth and its free exposition."); Byrne, Academic Freedom, supra note 25, at 286
("American academics have always insisted that speakers conform broadly to
the evolving standards of the discipline.").
107. Byrne, Academic Freedom, supra note 25, at 298 ("Despite their
analytical shortcomings, Sweezy and Keyishian contributed substantially to the
virtual extinction of overt efforts by non-academic government officials to
prescribe political orthodoxy in university teaching and research.") (emphasis in
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is little justification for affording academic protection to
decisions that are not academic in nature, but rather
ideological."s An academic decision seeks to enable
professors to develop new ideas and expand knowledge, and
to promote the optimal environment for exposing students to
new ideas and motivating them to rigorously pursue different
disciplines. By contrast, an ideological decision is motivated
by the goal of altering students' or professors' values, often as
a way of effectuating political or social change outside of the
learning arena.10 An academic decision does not attempt to
alter the resulting viewpoints of students to conform to
specific beliefs and values, but concerns the process by which
students are educated and exposed to new ideas.
When a private university's ideological positions affect
university policy, it should receive constitutional protection
as a private association, but it does not deserve academic
protection for its ideological expression or policies. Public
universities also cannot cloak themselves in academic
freedom when promoting ideological goals. A public
original). Some scholars even believe that academic freedom, as either a
professional or a constitutional right, should insulate professors from political
pressures placed on them by trustees or administrators. See Alan K. Chen,
Bureaucracy and Distrust: Germaneness and the Paradoxes of the Academic
Freedom Doctrine, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 955, 972 (2006) ("While institutional
academic freedom is crucial to the world of ideas, it is not clear why courts
ought to trust academic administrators, many of whom are subject to the same
political pressures (public and private) as other public officials, particularly
where something as vital as speech is concerned.").
108. The Supreme Court's landmark academic freedom cases of Sweezy and
Keyishian reject the rationale that the university's purpose is to instill
democratic values in its students. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 263 (1957). According to Horwitz, they rely "on a narrow conception of the
purpose of a university, one that emphasizes the search for truth and not any
alternative justifications for academic freedom." Horwitz, Grutter's First
Amendment, supra note 90, at 487. See also Byrne, What Next for Academic
Freedom?, supra note 18, at 951.
Inculcation of human values or modeling of professional values, while
legitimate, do not stand at the center of higher education;
investigation, discussion, critique, and judgment do.. . . But academic
freedom exists to protect a liberal education, which teaches students to
think carefully and fruitfully for themselves, something antithetical to
inculcation.
Id.
109. For distinctions between the educational and the ideological in another
context, the funding of organizations with student fees, see Galda v. Rutgers,
772 F.2d 1060 (3d Cir. 1985).
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university, as a state actor, cannot, for example, deny a
student due process or discriminate against the viewpoints of
students with a particular political leaning in order to
promote a particular ideological agenda. 110
D. Distinguishing the Academic from the Ideological
Because the academic venture concerns the pursuit of
knowledge and truth guided by the dictates of reason,
institutional academic freedom should provide deference to
the university's ideas about the process by which students
learn, as opposed to allowing the university to promote a
particular ideological stance. Universities as institutions
should be permitted a sphere of freedom to determine how
best to accomplish truly academic goals, such as selecting the
most qualified professors according to their academic
judgments, advancing students' ability to think and reason,
and exposing students to new ideas. In Grutter, the Supreme
Court partially deferred to the Law School's view that racial
and ethnic diversity provides educational benefits based on
the school's goal of promoting a robust and diverse exchange
of ideas.11 ' This mission is arguably not ideological. It does
not attempt to impose views upon students but seeks to
create an environment where students encounter a variety of
viewpoints. In an environment where students are exposed to
a diversity of ideas, they are better equipped to develop their
own views.
Although we believe that Grutter may have incorrectly
overlooked the University of Michigan Law School's actual
purpose in enacting its affirmative action program,112 Grutter
should be interpreted according to the principles the Court
claimed it was applying. Namely, the Court claimed it was
deferring to an admissions program designed to provide the
ideologically-neutral educational benefit of having an
environment richer in ideas and viewpoints."13
110. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). In Healy, the Court held that
a university may not discriminate based on viewpoint when determining
whether to recognize student organizations because "[tihe mere disagreement of
the President with the group's philosophy affords no reason to deny it
recognition." Id. at 187.
111. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003).
112. See supra note 38.
113. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-29.
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If, as Horwitz proposes, a university is empowered to
supersede state and federal laws subject to its own "changing
norms and values," 114 academic freedom will become a means
for a university to act in ways contrary to traditional notions
of the role of universities, as long as the university can justify
its behavior by citing its own internal norms. Although
Horwitz believes that a "sense of the scope and limits of
proper behavior have long since been internalized by
universities themselves,""s there are numerous well-
documented examples of universities engaging in surprising
tactics to overstep their primary role as facilitator of the
"marketplace of ideas,"116 and suppressing rights of students
and faculty in the process." 7 Universities have incentives,
both honorable and ignoble, to create an environment that
betrays the reasons they have been granted academic
114. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 4, at
1523.
115. Id. at 1542.
116. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 605-
606 (1967).
117. See, e.g., Jay Mathews, They Messed With the Wrong Blogger, WASH.
POST, July 24, 2009, available at
http://www.thefire.org/public/pdfs/4da9d663cd35b4773dc612216131a053.pdfdir
ect (detailing the attempts of Stanford University to stifle the speech of a
student critical of the philosophies of the Education Program); Editorial,
Curbing Speech at Quinnipiac, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/29/opinion/29wed3.html?-r=2 (criticizing the
university's "unusual lengths this semester to try to curb the activities of
student journalists"); Dorothy Rabinowitz, American Politics Aren't 'Post
Racial', WALL ST. J., July 7, 2008, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121538889902431161.html?mod=googlenewswsj (documenting the firing of a student employee at Indiana University-Purdue
University of Indianapolis for reading a book denouncing the Ku Klux Klan that
offended an onlooker). For an article chronicling a mandatory Residential Life
Training Program at the University of Delaware intended to shame students
into endorsing the university's views on race, gender, and sexuality, see Adam
Kissel, Please Report to Your Resident Assistant to Discuss Your Sexual Identity-
It's Mandatory! Thought Reform at the University of Delaware (Oct. 31, 2008),
http://www.thefire.org/article/9869.html. In another widely publicized case
involving breaches of due process and First Amendment rights, a student at the
public Valdosta State University was expelled via a letter for designing a
collage in protest of the construction of an expensive parking garage. See Notice
of Administrative Withdrawal from Valdosta State University President Ronald
Zaccari to T. Hayden Barnes, available at
httpJ/thefire.org/index.php/article/8521.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). After
Barnes filed a federal lawsuit, the university voted to reverse his expulsion. See
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, Victory for Free Speech at
Valdosta State University, Jan. 17, 2008,
http://www.thefire.org/article/8826.html.
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freedom rights, often when following their sincerely held
political ideals. Courts must guard the henhouse to ensure
that universities, unless they are acting in accordance with a
"proper educational mission," respect state and federal laws,
and that public universities uphold their constitutional
obligations.
When universities seek academic freedom to control their
admissions process, for example, they should not receive
extra deference to exclude Democratic students for the
purpose of better preparing Republican students for political
debate. Though such an admissions policy may seem
extreme, the law schools' position in Rumsfeld v. FAIR was
equally ideological: their freedom of expressive association
claim argued that the military's presence on campus
infringed on their ability to send the message that gays were
entitled to be treated equally in all careers.1 18 This message
may be honorable and important, but it is an ideological, not
academic, viewpoint. It sought to effectuate social change in
a way unrelated to the dissemination of knowledge or the
promotion of the academic enterprise, just as if the law
schools had, instead, sought academic freedom to express the
message that the military should discriminate against gays.
Although the law schools' expressive association claim failed
because the Court found that the military recruiters' brief
presence on campus did not infringe on the schools' ability to
express their message, the unaddressed academic freedom
claim should have failed for a different reason: because that
message is clearly the expression of an ideological position.1 '
Private universities that are ideologically oriented-such
as thoroughly religious colleges like Liberty and Bob Jones
University' 2 0-should receive the least amount of deference
under any conception of academic freedom because they
choose to forgo the pursuit of knowledge in favor of
predetermined ideological views. These universities exist in
large part to instill allegiance to a predetermined ideological
118. See supra Part I.B (discussing FAIR), 547 U.S. 47 (2006)).
119. Horwitz acknowledges this, but claims the only question the Court
should have asked is whether the schools sincerely saw the expression as part of
their academic mission. Horwitz, Three Faces, supra note 88, at 1133-35.
120. See Bob Jones University, University Creed and MVission, available at
httpJ/www.bju.edu/welcome/who-we-are/creed-mission.php (last visited Aug. 8,
2010); Liberty University, Statement of Purpose, available at
httpJ/www.1iberty.edu/index.cfm?PID=6899 (last visited Aug. 8, 2010).
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truth, and are to that degree more akin to churches and other
private religious associations that seek to further a shared
ideological mission. This distinction possibly explains why
the Supreme Court did not see academic freedom as
supporting Bob Jones University's claim against the Internal
Revenue Service's ruling that in order to obtain tax-exempt
status, Bob Jones needed to stop denying admission to
students who were either part of or advocated for interracial
marriages.121
Some scholars and courts have argued that a legitimate
academic purpose of universities should be expanded beyond
the pursuit of knowledge and the development of critical
thinking to include the inculcation of fundamental democratic
values.12 2 There is little Court precedent for such a position,
as spreading democratic values is a function of many civic
and state institutions, and it does not require freedom from
state interference to occur, nor does it result in the production
of new truths. 12 3 The judiciary and the political branches are
equally, if not more equipped, than the university to spread
democratic values.
Furthermore, the spread of "democratic values" can in
fact impede the search for knowledge. The spread of
democratic values means inculcating a particular ideology,
121. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that a
private university that maintained racially discriminatory policies did not
qualify for a tax exemption as a charitable organization because its policies
were "so at odds with the common community conscience as to undermine any
public benefit that might otherwise be conferred" by the university).
122. In an amicus curiae brief by the AAUP, for example, the association
claimed that academic freedom "protects faculty policies that set forth criteria
for advancing students into postgraduate employment and seek to instill
educational values that students will carry with them into that employment."
Brief for American Association of University Professors as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents, FAIR, (No. 04-1152), available at
http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/85233DO4-8816-4CDE-B3C7-
6028CDBF2D69/0/SolomonAmendmentAmicusBrief.pdf. See also Byrne,
Academic Freedom, supra note 25, at 279-83 (describing the "democratic value"
of higher education, which exists in tension with the role of the university to
serve truth-seeking functions and embraces the view that "students must
receive a coherent education in the traditions of civilized thought, writing, and
art.").
123. Indeed, the university is routinely distinguished from the high school,
which was intended to act in loco parentis and teach students proper morality
and behavior. See Kelly Sarabyn, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment: Resolving the
Federal Circuit Slit Over College Students' First Amendment Rights, 14 TEX. J.
C.L. & C.R. 27, 30-31, 35-40 (2008).
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and if spreading an ideology is recognized as a core function
of universities, academic work that is perceived to be
inherently or implicitly in conflict with that ideology could be
suppressed. 124 This can retard the growth of new truths, as
the Court has long recognized that the development of
knowledge is reliant on dialogue unfettered by ideological
restrictions.12 5  As a result, there is slim justification for
protecting such a function under the right to academic
freedom.
There may be instances when it is difficult to distinguish
an academic decision from an ideological one. For instance, a
public university may refuse to tenure a professor because it
disagrees with her ideological views, or because of her race or
gender (both non-academic reasons), but claim that the
tenure decision is based on her work being academically
unsound according to the standards of her department (a
legitimate academic reason). In some subjects-like physics,
mathematics, organic chemistry-there is much less potential
for confusion over whether a professor was fired for academic
reasons or for ideological reasons. In subjects that have an
inherent ideological component, such as politics or
philosophy, it is often much more difficult to discern.
In such cases, courts should look to the process by which
a university's decision was made. If a faculty committee is
124. See DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 318 n.18. (3d Cir. 2008)
(invalidating university's sexual harassment policy where "Plaintiff, a graduate
student pursuing a master's degree in Military and American History, argue[d]
that he felt inhibited in expressing his opinions in class concerning women in . .
. the military"); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 859-60 (E.D. Mich.
1989) (overturning university's Policy on Discrimination and Discriminatory
Harassment where "there existed a realistic and credible threat that Doe could
be sanctioned were he to discuss [controversial] biopsychological theories"
involving differences between the races or genders.) See also Note: Education
and the Court: The Supreme Court's Educational Ideology, 40 VAND. L. REV.
939, 953-54 (1987) ("The inculcative mission of primary and secondary public
education-to instill in children society's values-directly conflicts with higher
education's notion of academic freedom as the true marketplace of ideas where
students are exposed to diverse influences.").
125. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967) ("The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a
multitude of tongues, rather than through any kind of authoritative selection.")
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our
Nation.").
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making an institutional decision about tenure based on its
academic expertise, academic freedom would impart more
discretion to that decision because it involves a core academic
function-the faculty's assessment of a professor's academic
work. Assessment of academic quality should not be made by
the government, but rather by the standards of a particular
academic field. Having faculty make this judgment
minimizes the likelihood that the decision will be an
ideological one masquerading as an academic judgment,
although it does not, of course, eliminate it. 126
This type of discretion does not mean the court should
refrain from questioning all faculty-based academic decisions;
rather it affords such decisions a level of deference so that
they can have the breathing room needed in order to remain
free from the yokes of government-imposed orthodoxy. And
if, in contrast, the decision to deny a professor tenure is made
by administrators who are not as well versed in the dictates
of a particular discipline, less deference should be given to the
school's decision as it is more likely that such a decision will
be politically motivated.
In Grutter, the University of Michigan Law School should
have received this mid-level deference because the admissions
decisions were made by administrators and faculty acting
outside of their academic expertise.127  Indeed, they might
have been motivated by the political goal of achieving racial
balance instead of by a desire to foster a better learning
environment. The Court should have responded more
thoroughly to Justice Rehnquist's dissent and examined the
data substantiating the university's claim to determine
whether there was an indication that the university was
being disingenuous in stating an academic purpose. 1 28 But
126. A particularly difficult situation arises when disciplines and
departments become inherently ideological. Some departments have
incorporated ideological goals into their standards for what constitutes
academically qualified work. For instance, a women's studies program at the
University of South Carolina required students to "acknowledge that racism,
classism, sexism, heterosexism and other institutionalized forms of oppression
exist." See Ellen Sorokin, Women's studies mandates seen as threat to free
speech, WASH. TIMES, May 16, 2002, available at
http://www.thefire.org/public/pdfs/08718ee2be8208ba8a6e2d65c7ee6764.pdf.
One solution to this problem is to have the faculty at large make that judgment,
and have courts defer to that broader academic consensus.
127. See infra Part IV.B.
128. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 378-87 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
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the Court should still have afforded some deference to the
university's view that racial and ethnic diversity will foster a
robust educational environment. In Part IV, we will describe
in greater detail how a university can garner more or less
institutional deference. Before that, we turn to a discussion
of the interaction between institutional academic freedom and
other First Amendment interests.
III. INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY CANNOT TRAMPLE STUDENTS'
AND PROFESSORS' FIRST AMENDMENT ACADEMIC FREEDOM
RIGHTS
Before affording deference to a university's decisions
based on academic freedom, courts must also consider the
way a university's decision interacts with the First
Amendment academic freedom rights of students and faculty.
In this section, we posit that to the extent that universities
invoke institutional academic freedom for legitimate
academic purposes, they cannot infringe upon the academic
freedom rights of students and faculty. Thus, contrary to the
wishes of some scholars, universities should not invoke
academic freedom as a way to suppress undesirable
viewpoints. Further, institutional academic freedom cannot
be used as a way to diminish the academic freedom rights of
students and professors.
A. Institutional Academic Freedom Versus Free Expression
Because academic freedom, as a First Amendment value,
is bound up in the idea that "the nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to the ideas and mores
of students as diverse as this Nation,"'2 9 public universities
cannot usually invoke academic freedom as a way to
circumvent other First Amendment rights.13 0  Contrary to
dissenting).
129. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 313 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Public universities, as state actors, must respect the constitutional
academic freedom rights and other First Amendment rights of their faculty and
students. Although public institutions share the same academic freedom rights
against outside interference as private universities, they must abide by the
First Amendment. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 822 (1995) (noting that "[tihe University of Virginia, an
instrumentality of the Commonwealth for which it is named [is] bound by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments").
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Horwitz's view, a public university should not receive
deference to suppress speech it deems undesirable or against
its conception of its mission.a 1 Horwitz's approach would
contravene the very values that give rise to institutional
academic freedom in the first place.
Courts have consistently held that students and
professors maintain their First Amendment rights on college
campuses, and that public colleges must be engines of robust
discourse and debate.132  As Horwitz notes, courts have
universally overturned speech codes that restrict students'
expression everywhere on campus.13 3
Although institutional academic freedom cannot usually
be used in a way that would infringe on the free speech rights
students and professors would have in other environments, it
is important to note that there are situations in which a
university may make assessments about student work or a
faculty member's professionalism without violating the First
Amendment. Part of the mission of a university, as a First
Amendment institution, is to allow those with expertise in an
academic field to judge the academic quality of students' or
professors' work. Institutions may thus judge the academic
quality of speech by students and faculty without violating
their free speech rights. 13 4  Professors may control their
131. Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra note 4, at
1519.
Finally, a stronger degree of recognition of the institutional autonomy
of the university might well suggest that courts should reevaluate their
blanket rejection of campus speech codes grounded in the universities'
own considered judgment of the kinds of speech that do and do not
contribute to the academic mission, whether on public campuses or,
under state law, even private ones.
Id.
132. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 836 ("For the University, by
regulation, to cast disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students risks the
suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the
Nation's intellectual life, its college and university campuses."); Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) ("[The precedents of this Court leave no room for the
view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment
protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the
community at large . . . . [T]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.") (internal
citation omitted).
133. See supra note 108.
134. See Byrne, Threat, supra note 6, at 93 (explaining the intersection of
free speech and academic freedom by arguing that "[clolleges and universities
do not need to continue to employ professors whose writings clearly exhibit a
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classrooms and grade students on the quality of their work, so
long as they do not discriminate on the basis of ideological
viewpoint. Such discrimination is not justified by academic
freedom.
Institutions, accordingly, may fire or discipline professors
for producing poor quality work. But when students are
punished by the administration (as opposed to given a lower
grade by a professor) for controversial expression, or a
professor is fired for criticizing a university or for other
extracurricular speech, it is much less likely institutions will
be able to successfully argue that the restrictions were
motivated by academic, as opposed to ideological or personal,
concerns.
In line with the Court's general failure to clarify the
constitutional right of academic freedom, the state of the law
on professors' First Amendment rights is currently uncertain.
As we describe in the next section, the free speech rights of
public employees have been dramatically curtailed by the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos,135
which held that "when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from
employer discipline."'3 ' The Garcetti Court specifically noted,
however, that professors at public institutions may have
individual academic freedom rights that exempt their speech
from Garcetti's holding. 3 7 We must therefore examine how
institutional academic freedom interacts with the academic
freedom rights of professors and students.
B. Institutional Academic Freedom Versus Individual
Academic Freedom
Institutional academic freedom should not be used to
squash the academic freedom rights of students or professors.
The purpose of institutional academic freedom in preserving a
robust exchange of ideas would be undermined if universities
could invoke academic freedom to shelter themselves when
lack or loss of professional competence" so long as committees are established to
follow "fair procedures addressing the question of professional competence").
135. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
136. Id. at 421.
137. See id. at 425.
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stifling controversial or provocative views. Even Professor
Byrne, who generally believes that institutions and not
professors possess academic freedom rights, concedes that a
situation where "college administrators intentionally sought
to silence a professor through extraordinary administrative
means . . . falls within that small category of cases where [he]
acknowledgels] the propriety of judicial protection of
individual academic freedom." 3 s Byrne is referring to a case
where the City College of New York violated the First
Amendment rights of a philosophy professor, who published
controversial views about the disparity in intelligence
between blacks and whites.' In response to student
complaints, the college created alternate sections of his class,
denounced his views in a press release, and established a
committee to determine whether sanctions were warranted.14 0
As Byrne argues, the professor's scholarship should have
been judged by his colleagues on the basis of its academic
quality, not its purported ideological viewpoint.141
Academic freedom rights should protect professors above
and beyond the free speech rights of individual employees,
even when counterbalanced against institutional academic
freedom. The Court's recent decision in Garcetti, allowing the
government to strictly control its employees' on-duty speech,
left unresolved the scope of the academic freedom right of
professors against the university. In Garcetti, the Court
ruled that public employees, because they speak for the
government, can be punished for the content of what they say
while working in their official capacity, or "pursuant to their
official duties."142  Garcetti, however, involved a deputy
district attorney criticizing his county's district attorney's
office, far removed from the university setting. 4 1 In light of
concerns voiced by dissenting justices,'" the Court
138. Byrne, Threat, supra note 6, at 93.
139. Id. (citing Levin v. Harleston, 770 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd in
part and vacated in part, Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992)).
140. Levin, 770 F. Supp. at 897-99.
141. Byrne, Threat, supra note 6, at 93-94.
142. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
143. Id. at 413-15.
144. Id. at 438 ("I have to hope that today's majority does not mean to imperil
First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and
universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write 'pursuant to . .. official
duties.'") (Souter, J. dissenting). Joining Justice Souter's dissent were Justices
Stevens and Ginsberg. Justices Stevens and Breyer also wrote separate
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specifically noted that Garcetti's holding may not apply to
professors at public institutions because of their academic
freedom rights.'4 5
As the Court has yet to rule on whether and how
academic freedom insulates professors from Garcetti's
holding, federal courts have taken different approaches.
Some have held that Garcetti is directly applicable. 4 6 Others
have not ruled on the question, but have previously held that
constitutional academic freedom rights belong only to the
institution.'4 7 In these courts, professors have the same
speech rights as all other public employees, whose rights are
now dramatically limited by Garcetti.148 Universities would
thus be able to fire professors for controversial or ideologically
objectionable speech, despite its academic merits, in the same
fashion that a deputy sheriff could be fired for criticizing
police tactics. In contrast, some courts have not applied
Garcetti's holding to professors.'4 9
dissents.
145. See id. at 425.
There is some argument that expression related to academic
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court's
customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that
reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would
apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to
scholarship or teaching.
Id.
146. The Seventh Circuit has taken this approach in the high school context,
although professors have greater academic freedom rights than high school
teachers, as the high school is not the primary locus of academic freedom
interests. See Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480
(7th Cir. 2007) ("Mayer's current-events lesson was part of her assigned tasks in
the classroom; Garcetti applies directly.").
147. See Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 74-75 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that
"the professor is acting as the university's proxy" when he speaks in the
classroom) (citations omitted).
148. See Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. Of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 171-72,
172 n.14 (3d Cir. 2008) (leaving undecided whether Garcetti applies to public
school teachers, but holding that teachers have no academic freedom right to in-
class speech regarding what is taught and how it is taught).
149. In the high school context, for example, some courts continue to assess
teachers' speech under Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205,
391 U.S. 563 (1968), which protects high school teachers' speech on matters of
public concern. Oddly, although the Fourth Circuit does not recognize a
professor's right to academic freedom, it has declined to apply Garcetti to the
speech of teachers at public schools. See Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 484 F.3d
687, 695, n.11 (4th Cir. 2007) (continuing to apply Pickering test to teacher's
speech because the Supreme Court in Garcetti "explicitly did not decide whether
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The most sensible way to protect the academic freedom
rights of faculty at public institutions is to treat them as akin
to independent contractors on the issue of speech-their
speech is funded, but not directed or scripted, by the
government. As a result, Garcetti's holding, which bears
upon public employees, would not infringe on professors'
rights to speak freely and controversially in their area of
expertise within the bounds of academic quality, which can be
considered a condition on the funding. As long as the
professor speaks in an academically qualified way on her
subject, a public university cannot restrict her ability to
express controversial or ideologically unpopular views. 15 0
In the next section, we explore instances when a
university should receive institutional deference, and
articulate a framework for determining how much deference
should be granted.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AND DEGREES OF DEFERENCE
Thus far, this article has occupied itself with the
threshold questions a court must determine before it can
consider granting constitutional deference to a university
decision. Once a court holds that a university's decision is
truly made "on academic grounds,"5 1 it then must determine
the magnitude of Grutter's "degree of deference." This section
begins to address that question by outlining several practical
factors that would entitle universities to more or less
deference depending on the circumstances.
Grutter states that, once a decision is determined to be
academic, "good faith lon the part of the university] is
[its] analysis would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related
to teaching"). In Lee, the Fourth Circuit declined to apply Garcetti to a
teacher's speech despite the fact that the Fourth Circuit had previously held in
Urofsky that institutions, and not professors, possess academic freedom rights.
See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 414-15 (4th Cir. 2000).
150. This may also apply to speech made about the functioning of the
university, i.e. intramural speech, if a professor's academic expertise renders
him more qualified to opine on how university decisions impact the learning
environment. And, as Garcetti applies only to speech made pursuant to a public
employee's official duties, a professor's speech made outside of the university
context is accorded the same First Amendment rights as all citizens.
151. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 363 (2003) (quoting Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)).
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presumed absent a showing to the contrary." 152 Although this
language is highly deferential, it is important to examine
what is required for this showing to the contrary. Grutter
itself did not simply presume good faith, but instead relied on
the evidence submitted by the law school and its amici in
determining that the university's preference for racial
diversity in the student body did indeed further educational
goals.'13  On the other hand, Grutter seemingly ignored the
clear showing to the contrary that the Law School's
admissions process was in actuality more akin to the racial
balancing proscribed by Bakke than it was to a genuine
search for the true diversity conducive to robust dialogue.'5 4
We believe that Grutter's convoluted application of
institutional academic freedom was less rigorous due to the
Court's specific concern with preserving affirmative action
programs at universities.
Although Grutter's inconsistencies and ambiguities make
for confusing precedent, the Court's clear message that
institutional decisions receive a degree of deference cannot be
dismissed. In our view, the magnitude of deference given on
the basis of institutional academic freedom should depend
upon the type of decision a university is making, whether the
university is invoking academic freedom as a constitutional
right that shields it from state interference or as part of a
compelling state interest that might outweigh individuals'
constitutional rights, and which body of the university is
making that decision. If a university is operating within a
core academic area, within the bounds of the four freedoms-
152. Id. at 329 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-
19 (1978)). Grutter generally states this presumption of good faith as part of its
holding that the law's school goal in student body diversity serves a compelling
interest because obtaining diversity is "at the heart of the Law School's proper
institutional mission." Id. However, Bakke's presumption of good faith applied
only to negate the assumption, absent a showing to the contrary, that "a
university, professing to employ a facially nondiscriminatory admissions policy,
would operate it as a cover for the functional equivalent of a quota system."
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
153. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-31 ("The Law School's assessment that
diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits is substantiated by respondents
and their amici."). The Court was especially persuaded by the amicus brief of
the United States Military, which asserted that a "highly qualified, racially
diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle
mission to provide national security." Id. at 331.
154. Id. at 383-84 tbl.1 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting).
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who may teach, what shall be taught, how the curriculum
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study-more
deference should attach."5 Beyond that, different levels of
deference should apply depending on who is making the
decision, in what capacity the decisionmaker is acting, and
against whose rights the institutional academic freedom is
being balanced.
A. Faculty as Expert Decisionmaker
As touched on above, the high-water mark of Grutter's
institutional deference should be granted when university
actions are dictated by faculty committees acting as
decisionmakers based on their academic expertise. Even if
these decisions require final ratification from administrators,
if the faculty serves as primary decisionmaker, such decisions
are more likely to be made on academic grounds."5 ' Faculty
members' decisions based on their knowledge and experience
fall within the heart of academic freedom's requirement that
truth emerge based on discourse within a discipline instead of
being governmentally imposed, or subject to political
pressure.' 5  Historical understandings of academic freedom
155. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263. Byrne, What Next for Academic Freedom?,
supra note 18, at 929-30 (discussing four freedoms).
156. This accords with Professor Areen's conception of government-as-
educator. See Areen, supra note 13, at 995 ("Under the government-as-educator
doctrine, if a university shows that its disciplinary decision was supported by
the faculty (or by an authorized committee of the faculty), a court should
presume that the decision was made on academic grounds and defer to it.").
Professor Areen argues that:
[Clourts should defer to an academic decision made by the faculty as a
body (or a standing committee of the faculty) unless the plaintiff is able
to show that the decision was 'such a substantial departure from
accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the faculty did not
exercise its professional judgment.
Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)).
157. See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the
vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train
our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation ...
. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding;
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.
Id.
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also prized the department or committee of faculty as being
safest for protecting academic decisions and being least
susceptible to corruption. 5 8
Examples of actions by faculty serving in a
decisionmaking capacity include hiring, firing, and tenure
determinations made by committees comprised of faculty
members, or dismissals of students for poor academic
performance after assessment by faculty. These academic
decisions, even when parties challenge them for violating the
Constitution at a public university or for violating federal or
state law at any university, should receive the least amount
of judicial scrutiny. This is not to say that faculty committees
are entitled to violate constitutional or other legal rights in
making tenure decisions. However, if a challenge is brought
by an aggrieved faculty member against a faculty committee's
decision, the court should require less of a demonstration by
the faculty that they acted in "good faith"-i.e., that they
denied tenure based on academic quality instead of on an
unlawful, or academically irrelevant, basis. Absent a clear
demonstration that the professor's legal rights were violated,
decisions of this nature should be largely insulated from
judicial scrutiny.
Courts already employ a form of this faculty-as-expert
deference in other contexts, although not within the
institutional academic freedom framework advanced by this
article, and not labeled as such. When adjudicating due
process claims, for example, courts require universities to
provide fewer procedural safeguards before suspending a
student for poor academic performance than for conduct-
based disciplinary charges.' 5  Courts have held that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a
public university, before suspending or expelling an enrolled
student for disciplinary reasons, to provide adequate process,
including fair notice and a hearing to contest the charges. 6 0
158. See generally David M. Rabban, Does Academic Freedom Limit Faculty
Autonomy?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1405 (1988) (providing a historical overview of the
evolution of professional academic freedom and the peer review process).
159. See generally Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78
(1978) (no due process hearing required for purely academic dismissal of
student).
160. See Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 1988) (explaining
the process required for a university disciplinary hearing); Dixon v. Ala. State
Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1951) (establishing due process
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This is so courts can determine whether a school is properly
assessing the disciplinary charges before depriving students
of their property interest in continued enrollment. 161
However, universities are not required to provide these
same procedural safeguards when dismissing students solely
on the basis of poor academic performance.16 2  The due
process requirements are significantly relaxed in this arena
due to the notion that assessments of academic performance
should be judged by those with expertise in the field, and
judicial scrutiny would impair that decisionmaking. Due
process challenges based on dismissals for poor academic
performance are therefore almost entirely foreclosed.
As the Supreme Court noted in Board of Curators of
University of Missouri v. Horowitz, "[1]ike the decision of an
individual professor as to the proper grade for a student in
his course, the determination whether to dismiss a student
for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of
cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the
procedural tools of judicial or administrative
decisionmaking."16 3 The import of Horowitz is that schools
are not required to provide as comprehensive or as well-
documented procedures to ensure the propriety of academic
dismissals as for disciplinary dismissals. Although not
distinguished on the basis of academic freedom,'" less
judicial scrutiny is given to the procedures followed when
assessing a student's academic merit than those followed for
determinations that a student has committed a disciplinary
offense such as theft or vandalism.
In addition, the Supreme Court has cautioned against
judicial scrutiny of the substance of academic decisions. As
the Court held in Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing,
"[w]hen judges are asked to review the substance of a
requirements for disciplinary hearings). See also Elizabeth Ledgerwood
Pendlay, Note, Procedure for Pupils: What Constitutes Due Process in a
University Disciplinary Hearing?, 82 N.D. L. REV. 967 (2006).
161. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975); see also Henson v. Honor
Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 73 (4th Cir. 1983).
162. See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90-91 (holding that the judicial process is not
well-suited to evaluating propriety of decision to expel a medical student for
failure to meet academic standards).
163. Id. at 90.
164. The Horowitz court did indicate an aversion to "further enlarg[ing] the
judicial presence in the academic community." Id.
256 [Vol:51
DEGREE OF DEFERENCE
genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they should
show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment."'e
Allowing academic decisions to be made by academic experts,
not the government, is the foundational reason for academic
freedom. Courts should therefore ensure the widest latitude
is given to faculty-driven decisions assessing academic
quality, like the hiring and firing of professors and the grade
evaluation of students.
Unless an individual complainant clearly demonstrates
that a faculty assessment was not based on truly academic
grounds, decisions about academic quality made by faculty
should be presumptively valid. For example, in employment
discrimination cases, Title VII proof requirements should be
altered to give some deference to the university's evidence
that the decision was not based on race, gender, or other
proscribed (and academically irrelevant) characteristics.'
And professors launching First Amendment challenges to the
denial of tenure, if based on faculty assessments and not
administrative action, would have to overcome the strong
presumption that the faculty committee denied tenure based
on academic quality,16  not based on ideological viewpoint. 168
In order to ensure that these academic decisions are made by
experts, summary judgment standards must be altered to
avoid burdensome litigation and minimize judicial
intervention. 6 9
B. Actions by Administrators or Faculty as Administrator
Institutional actions based on decisions made by
165. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (denying
student's claim that he had a constitutional right to retake an exam) (emphasis
added).
166. This position exists in some tension with Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC. See
supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. However, subpoenaing records
alone does not intrude upon the faculty's tenure selection as directly as allowing
a Title VII lawsuit to proceed.
167. If administrative action was taken against a professor before consulting
faculty expertise, however, the faculty-as-expert deference would not apply.
168. However, because academic freedom stems from First Amendment
concerns, universities should be given less deference when professors or
students bring First Amendment challenges than when other challenges are
brought. See infra Part IV.B.
169. This view is not contrary to the result in Walker v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Wis. Sys., 300 F. Supp. 2d 836, 842-43 (W.D. Wis. 2004), because, in
that case, the administration made an employment decision about another
administrator, the assistant chancellor for student affairs. See supra Part I.C.
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administrators or faculty acting outside their disciplinary
expertise, in an administrative capacity, deserve less
deference. These actions lack the academic expertise upon
which academic freedom was founded. However, a
substantial number of the decisions related to the essential
freedoms of a university to determine "who may teach, what
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study" are made by faculty acting in an
administrative capacity or administrators. Grutter itself
involved a prospective student challenging a university's
decision to deny her application, based on an admissions
policy designed by faculty serving as administrators. 7 0 Such
decisions are important to the structure and function of the
university, but are more tangential to the pursuit of
knowledge than decisions made on scholarly expertise. They
are also more likely to be made based on managerial,
bureaucratic, or ideological considerations than for academic
reasons, as administrators are concerned with budgets,
soliciting donations, managing personal conflicts and the
public image of the institution.
To safeguard the university's autonomy when making
"complex educational judgments,"' however, administrative
decisions that involve some amount of academic expertise
should be entitled to greater deference than if academic
freedom were not involved. This is especially true when
faculty-the ones who possess that expertise-are involved in
the process.
Within the category of administrative decisions, judges
should assess the type of challenges brought by individual
faculty members or students in order to determine how much
deference to apply. For instance, because silencing professors
or students on the basis of their ideas contravenes the
rationale animating academic freedom, less institutional
deference should be afforded when professors or students
launch First Amendment challenges against
administrators. 7 2  Judges should not greatly relax their
scrutiny if a professor alleges that she was punished by
administrators on the basis of an ideological viewpoint
170. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 312 (2003).
171. Id. at 328.
172. See supra Part III.
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expressed in class or in her scholarship.'
Cases of this type often arise when a professor's speech is
found by administrators to violate university policy. For
instance, in the case of Silva v. University of New Hampshire,
a tenured professor was suspended without pay for one year
for statements he made during lectures, including analogizing
the focus required for good writing to a sexual relationship.174
The university found that his speech violated its sexual
harassment policy.175 In Silva, the district court correctly
held that applying the sexual harassment policy to Silva's
classroom speech violated his First Amendment rights
"because it employ[ed] an impermissibly subjective standard
that failled] to take into account the nation's interest in
academic freedom."7 6  Here, the court is referring to the
individual professor's academic freedom, which operates as a
shield against the deference given to universities invoking
institutional academic freedom, especially when making
administrative decisions about which speech is appropriate or
sexist instead of which speech is of high academic quality.
Further, even less deference should be afforded to
administrative decisions regarding extracurricular speech, or
those decisions made about students' speech or behavior
outside of class, or about professors who are not acting
pursuant to their official duties. These administrative
judgments are not only further attenuated from assessments
about academic quality, but they are also farther removed
from the management of core university activities.
Universities, therefore, should not be given deference based
on institutional academic freedom when they enact speech
codes,"' which govern student, and sometimes faculty,
expression outside of class. The administration should also
receive less deference than professors acting in the faculty-as-
173. Even those who narrowly define professors' academic freedom rights
believe that these rights cover the ability to express controversial views, if
academically supported. See Emergency Coalition to Defend Educ. Travel v.
U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 545 F.3d 4, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("Assuming that the right
to academic freedom exists and that it can be asserted by an individual
professor ... the right can be invoked only to prevent a governmental effort to
regulate the content of a professor's academic speech.") (emphasis in original).
174. 888 F. Supp. 293, 298 (D.N.H. 1994).
175. Id. at 303.
176. Id. at 314.
177. Contra Horwitz, Universities as First Amendment Institutions, supra
note 4, at 1519.
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expert category when it penalizes a student for her speech
because such a demerit is less likely to be academically-
based.
Even though administrators or faculty serving as
administrators should not receive the same deference as
faculty members acting within their area of academic
expertise, they should receive the most deference an
administrator can receive when making core administrative
decisions that implicate academic matters. For example, in
Walker v. Board of Regents, a university failed to renew the
contract of the assistant chancellor for student affairs.",, Her
Title VII lawsuit alleged that the university's decision was
based on her race and gender."' The district court refused to
afford any deference to the university's stated reasons for
refusing to renew Walker's contract.18 0 As in Grutter, some
amount of "good faith" deference should have been presumed
because college administrators were making an
administrative decision regarding Walker's capacity to
assume the administrative role of vice chancellor of student
affairs. These types of decisions require some expertise on
running a university, and courts should defer to the
university's prerogative to govern itself academically by
affording the university a greater presumption of good faith.
An application of deference in this context would involve
shifting more of the burden to Walker to overcome summary
judgment.
C. Institutional Academic Freedom as a Constitutional Right
that can Supersede State and Federal Law
Academic freedom invoked as a constitutional right
capable of facially invalidating state or federal law, and not
just a thumb on the scale in a constitutional analysis
evaluating a purported infringement of other parties'
constitutional rights, diverts from Grutter significantly. As a
result, this application of institutional academic freedom
stands on shakier judicial ground. Still, there is some
support for it in the doctrine. This is particularly true when
state or federal law encroaches on core academic assessments,
178. Walker v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 300 F. Supp. 2d 836, 840-
41 (W.D. Wis. 2004).
179. Id. at 842-43.
180. Id. at 858.
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or the proper foundational mission of the university.
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, for example, the
Supreme Court invalidated New York laws requiring faculty
to sign certificates stating that they were not members of the
Communist Party and barring them from membership in
particular organizations."' Although the laws were deemed
unconstitutional due to vagueness, overbreadth, and for
violating associational rights, the Court cited Sweezy v. New
Hampshire's statements regarding the "essentiality of
freedom in the community of American universities."'82 In
invalidating the New York law, the Court remarked that
"[tihe Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues, rather than
through any kind of authoritative selection." 83  Keyishian
exemplifies the type of case where institutional academic
freedom should trump state law because the state is directly
controlling who may teach based on adherence to an
ideological orthodoxy.
The First Circuit's decision in Asociaci6n de Educaci6n
Privada de P.R. v. Garcia-Padilla may also fall within this
framework." Puerto Rican regulations sought to control, by
some measure, the textbooks used by private high schools. 185
Although the court of appeals distinguished high schools as
having fewer academic freedom rights than universities, the
regulations interfered with curricula, lesson plans, and the
school's ability to "convey its own message."' This is a direct
intrusion on a basic academic function of the university, and
should be subject to scrutiny based on the constitutional right
to institutional academic freedom.
Similarly, a challenge to a state law that restricted
university employees from accessing sexually explicit
material on state-owned computers, if brought by an
institution on the basis of academic freedom, should
181. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 591-
92, 606 (1967).
182. Id. at 603.
183. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. Asociaci6n de Educaci6n Privada de P.R., Inc. v. Garcia-Padilla, 490
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007). See supra Part I.C.
185. Asociaci6n de Educaci6n Privada de P.R., 490 F.3d at 11-13, 18-19.
186. Id. at 12-13, 20.
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prevail. 87 This law directly impacts the information a faculty
member may access while performing her professorial duties,
and thus implicates the core academic functions of learning,
transmitting information, and arriving at the truth through a
multitude of tongues.
It is more difficult to determine whether institutional
academic freedom should govern in situations like the one
presented in the Sixth Circuit case of Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action v. Granholm."'8 In Granholm, a Michigan
state ballot initiative proscribed affirmative action in college
admissions decisions.' 9 Plaintiffs claimed that the initiative
interfered with the university's ability to select its students,
and thus intruded upon the university's freedom to decide
who may be admitted to study.'90 However, states should be
entitled to enact regulations affecting admissions that do not
directly implicate academic concerns or impede the
fulfillment of the school's legitimate academic mission.
Residency requirements for public universities, for instance,
fulfill the legitimate state interest of providing state residents
with access to state-funded universities. Although these
requirements may affect the composition of the student body
by lowering the price of tuition for state residents, these rules
are far more attenuated from interfering with the purpose of
academic freedom than the loyalty oaths in Keyishian or even
the textbook regulations in Asociacion de Educacion Privada.
The Michigan constitutional amendment banning race-
conscious admissions was designed to eradicate unequal
treatment on the basis of race in admissions decisions.
However, the Grutter court held that these preferences help
enhance "student body diversity," which is "essential" to the
school's mission.' 9' Although opaquely stated, it appears that
Grutter never held that racial preferences are necessary to
achieving student body diversity, or essential to the Law
School's proper educational mission, but only that the race-
conscious admissions program was narrowly tailored to
achieve student body diversity, broadly defined, which was
187. E.g., Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000).
188. 473 F.3d 237 (6th Cir. 2009).
189. Id. at 239.
190. See supra Part I.C.
191. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
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considered essential to the Law School's mission.192  If,
alternatively, the Court had held that racial diversity was
necessary to achieving a university's proper mission, then
Michigan's law would be closer to the law prohibited in
Keyishian, as the Michigan law would severely undermine a
university's ability to fulfill its proper educational mission.
We therefore agree with the outcome in Granholm, but not
without reservation.
Without further guidance from the Supreme Court,
institutional academic freedom as a constitutional right
capable of facially invalidating state or federal law stands on
less well-established ground, and courts should perhaps tread
lightly in deciding to overturn state laws on this basis.
Nevertheless, when state or federal laws interfere with the
core freedoms necessary to the development of academic
expertise and the dissemination of knowledge, courts should
protect the institution's autonomy and its ability to make
academic decisions without state or federal interference.
CONCLUSION
This article has endeavored to begin a task that courts
have resisted for decades: delineating some of the contours of
academic freedom. Although this task demands great time
and attention from scholars and the judiciary, we have
provided some useful factors for courts to consider when
complying with Grutter's mandate to allow universities a
"degree of deference" when making decisions "on academic
grounds."
Since Grutter, lower courts have struggled to apply
institutional academic freedom in a principled and coherent
way. Courts show different degrees of willingness to indulge
this ill-defined right, and courts are confounded by which
framework to apply when addressing this special concern of
the First Amendment. We have proposed both threshold
questions to answer before the right can be applied, and a
framework for placing the right in its proper context. Courts
must first determine whether an issue is truly "academic," in
192. The strict scrutiny test for equal protection violations asks whether
government action is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest, see id. at 326, but does not require that the government action be the
only means to achieving that interest.
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the sense of being non-ideological and harmonious with the
proper, historical institutional mission of promoting truth
through a robust exchange of ideas. As part of this initial
inquiry, courts should examine how institutional academic
freedom coexists with the academic freedom rights and
certain other First Amendment rights of students and faculty.
Then, once the right is established, courts should examine
who is invoking the right, in what capacity, and against
whom the right is being marshaled.
There is much work to be done before the questions
precipitated by the Grutter majority opinion can be
authoritatively resolved. Until Grutter, there was still room
to argue that academic freedom had never independently
affected the outcome of a decision. Now, that argument is all
but foreclosed,s 3 and courts must determine the extent to
which Grutter meant what it said. Academic freedom occupies
a special place in our constitutional tradition and in order for
it to be preserved, it must be clarified. We hope this article
has contributed to the ongoing dialogue on how to do so.
193. One scholar, who calls institutional academic freedom a "jurisprudential
mirage," maintains that Grutter never "held that academic institutions are
entitled to either academic freedom or autonomy under the First Amendment."
See Hiers, supra note 11, at 52-56.
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